Keeping intelligence under control by Mallozzi, Piergiuseppe et al.
Keeping intelligence under control
Downloaded from: https://research.chalmers.se, 2019-05-11 11:52 UTC
Citation for the original published paper (version of record):
Mallozzi, P., Pelliccione, P., Menghi, C. (2018)
Keeping intelligence under control
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Software Engineering for Cognitive Services: 37-40
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3195555.3195558
N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.
research.chalmers.se offers the possibility of retrieving research publications produced at Chalmers University of Technology.
It covers all kind of research output: articles, dissertations, conference papers, reports etc. since 2004.
research.chalmers.se is administrated and maintained by Chalmers Library
(article starts on next page)
Keeping Intelligence under Control
Piergiuseppe Mallozzi
Chalmers University of Technology |
University of Gothenburg
Sweden
mallozzi@chalmers.se
Patrizio Pelliccione
Chalmers University of Technology |
University of Gothenburg
Sweden
patrizio.pelliccione@gu.se
Claudio Menghi
Chalmers University of Technology |
University of Gothenburg
Sweden
menghi@chalmers.se
ABSTRACT
Modern software systems, such as smart systems, are based on a
continuous interaction with the dynamic and partially unknown
environment in which they are deployed. Classical development
techniques, based on a complete description of how the system
must behave in different environmental conditions, are no longer
effective. On the contrary, modern techniques should be able to pro-
duce systems that autonomously learn how to behave in different
environmental conditions.
Machine learning techniques allow creating systems that learn
how to execute a set of actions to achieve a desired goal. When a
change occurs, the system can autonomously learn new policies
and strategies for actions execution. This flexibility comes at a cost:
the developer has no longer full control on the system behaviour.
Thus, there is no way to guarantee that the system will not violate
important properties, such as safety-critical properties.
To overcome this issue, we believe that machine learning tech-
niques should be combined with suitable reasoning mechanisms
aimed at assuring that the decisions taken by the machine learning
algorithm do not violate safety-critical requirements. This paper
proposes an approach that combines machine learning with run-
time monitoring to detect violations of system invariants in the
actions execution policies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a need for the systems to be “smart". Smart systems are
systems that continuously sense the environment in which they
operate, are able to detect changes, and react to those changes.
The environment in which smart systems operate is usually dy-
namic, uncontrollable, and partially known. For example, in the au-
tomotive domain, drivers behaviours are sometimes unpredictable,
animals unexpectedly can cross roads, etc. Smart systems have to
deal with such unpredictability and uncertainty in a “self-adaptive"
manner. Self-adaptation refers to the capability, performed at run-
time without human intervention, of a system in autonomously
changing its behaviour in response to changes [1, 2].
Classical development techniques require to fully describe the
system behaviour in all the different environmental conditions. This
is unpractical — if not even impossible — in smart systems where
there is a high number of environmental conditions to be considered
for adaptation. For this reason, modern development techniques for
smart systems must rely on techniques that allow creating systems
that autonomously learn how to behave in different environmental
conditions.
Machine learning techniques are able to autonomously learn
how to act on a running system to achieve a desired goal. Such
techniques are based onmodels trained on data and examples rather
than logic programs with predefined rules. The programmer is re-
placed by a machine that can continuously update its models as new
data comes from the environment. After training them, machine
learning models allow for the effective handling of changes i.e.,
when a change occurs the system autonomously learns new poli-
cies for actions execution. The use of machine learning drastically
changes how software systems are developed, i.e., the choice of
which the actions to be executed in the different environmental
condition is no longer in the developer’s hands but is rather au-
tomatic. In this paper, we use reinforcement learning since it is a
powerful machine learning technique for decision making.
The automatic support provided by machine learning techniques
moves control from the developers to the system hands. Thus, the
developer is no longer able to ensure that the systemwill not violate
important properties, i.e., invariants, that may be used to represent
for example safety-critical properties. In the automotive domain, for
example, the developer has no longer control on ensuring whether
a self-driving car is going to take a decision that is safe for the par-
ticular situation or not. Wrong decisions performed by the machine
learning engine may result in car accidents and serious injuries
for the passengers. Thus, we believe that while there is a need for
systems to be self-adaptive, there is also a need to “keep intelligence
under control".
We envision a new approach, in the following named WiseML,
to ensure that machine learning decisions do not cause the viola-
tion of a set of “important" properties. This approach combines
machine learning, and specifically Reinforcement Learning (RL) [3],
with run-time monitoring techniques which aim at ensuring the
preservation of important safety-critical requirements. On one side,
WiseML allows the systems to adapt through the use of machine
learning techniques. On the other side, WiseML employs run-time
monitoring to continuously check that the policies suggested by
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reinforcement learning will not violate a set of safety-critical re-
quirements.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes some of
the challenges of reinforcement learning when used as instrument
to enable run-time adaptation. Section 3 describes WiseML, our
envisioned approach. Section 4 presents reinforcement learning: a
machine learning technique that can be used within WiseML to
enable self-adaptation. Section 5 presents monitoring techniques
that can be used within WiseML. Section 6 discusses the proposed
approach. Section 7 concludes with final remarks.
2 CHALLENGES OF REINFORCEMENT
LEARNING
At each step, a reinforcement learning agent perceives observation
(the state of the environment), applies actions, and receives a reward.
The goal that the agent has to achieve is expressed by conveying a
reward signal for each action it applies. The agent will eventually
learn a policy, i.e. the action to be applied to the observed state,
which maximises the cumulative expected reward. In this section,
we describe some of the challenges of reinforcement learning as
also pointed out by Koopman [4].
Overfitting problem - Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques
require a set of training data that have to be independent of the
validation data to avoid overfitting. One main problem with ma-
chine learning methods is that they are optimised for average cost
function and they do not guarantee for corner cases. Challenges
in this area are compromised by the fact that when using methods
such as neural networks, it is difficult for humans to understand
the rules that have been learned by simply looking at its weights.
Black swan - When the neural network learns the rules from a
training set, if certain data is missing or wrongly correlated to the
training data, the network may fail and potentially cause safety
hazards. In other words, if there is a special case that the system has
not experienced, it cannot correctly predict such case; this is known
as the black sworn problem [5]. Hence, it is hard to detect and isolate
bugs where the behaviour is not expressed with traditional lines
of codes but entrusted to a neural network. The network would
need to be retrained with also the potential risk to “unlearn" correct
behaviours.
Reward hacking - An incorrect specification of the reward func-
tion can cause unexpected behaviours to the agent. One of the prob-
lems is reward hacking [6]: when the reward function is not exactly
representing the designer’s intention, the agent might optimise
towards an imprecise reward function and behave unexpectedly
meaning that the agent exploits the reward function and manages
to get a high reward without achieving the designer’s intentions,
but instead optimising towards the rewards function that is indeed
not exactly representing the designer’s intentions. For example,
in the case of a cleaning robot, the reward function might give a
positive reward for not seeing any mess then the agent might learn
to disable its vision rather than cleaning up. Instead, if the reward is
given only when the robot actually cleans up then the robot might
learn to make a mess first and then cleaning up so that it keeps
receiving more and more rewards.
3 WISEML
Figure 1 shows an overview of WiseML.
WiseML considers both functional and non-functional require-
ments in the adaptation framework. Functional requirements are
the Goals (G) WiseML must achieve. Non-functional requirements
refer to the properties WiseML must ensure and they are repre-
sented in the form of Invariants (I).
WiseML receives as input the goalsG to be achieved ( 2 ) and a
set of invariants I to be ensured ( 3 ). It perceives the state of the
environment through a set of input variables ( 1 ) and performs
the actions ( 4 ) to apply to the environment that aims at reaching
the desired goals.
WiseML uses a reinforcement learning agent as machine learn-
ing engine, indicated in Fig. 1 using an appropriate component,
and a monitor component ( 7 ). Once trained the reinforcement
learning agent automatically computes the action to be executed.
The monitor component blocks the actions that most probably
will violate invariants and provides feedback to the machine learn-
ing component so that it will learn from mistakes intercepted by
the run-time monitor ( 8 ). The interplay between the machine
learning and the monitoring components is designed to enable the
integration of enforcement techniques as well as other techniques
able to manage the erroneous behaviours intercepted by the moni-
tor. For instance, this would permit to switch to a safety mode in
the case of the system is in a critical situation.
For example, an RL agent in charge of driving may receive re-
wards related with the following goals: stay in the middle of the
lane, drive to the desired speed, avoid obstacles etc. The monitor will
continuously check at runtime that the agent does produce actions
that will violate important invariants of the system: keep a certain
distance to the other vehicles, do not go off road, do not crash, etc.
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Figure 1: Overview ofWiseML.
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Machine learning. The reinforcement learning agent observes
the state of the environment to detect how it reacts to the performed
stimuli, i.e., the chosen actions ( 1 ). We envision the reinforcement
learning agent to use a Reward Shaping component, that issues
rewards to the agent to drive it towards the goals to be achieved,
penalising it for acting bad and rewarding it for acting well. Based
on the rewards it collects, it learns a policy, i.e. a function that maps
the observations from the environment to actions to be performed
on it. The reward function can also be affected by the feedback
received by the monitor component, in case the selected action
caused a violation of any invariant ( 8 ). In this sense, the monitor
plays the role of a teacher for the learning algorithm. Eventually,
the agent will learn a policy that maximises the cumulative reward
by trial and error with the environment. Once an action is selected,
it is then performed on the environment 4 .
Monitoring. It aims at detecting whether the actions chosen
by the machine learning component ( 6 ) are going to cause a
violation of any invariant. In this sense, the monitoring algorithm
should be predictive, i.e., it should detect violations of invariants
before they will occur. The monitoring component relies on the
Runtime Enforcer to ensure that the behaviour of the RL agent is
compliant with certain properties, i.e., the invariants of the system.
The Runtime Enforcer acts on the running system by allowing and
forbidding actions of being executed.
The monitor evaluates the effect of actions on an abstract rep-
resentation of the system, which is maintained updated using the
information detected using the input variables ( 5 ). If the evalu-
ation detects a violation, the monitoring component prevents the
action for being executed ( 7 ) and sends feedback to the machine
learning component ( 8 ). This feedback will be then integrated
into the reward function by the reward shaping component. If no
violation has been detected, then no barrier is activated ( 7 ) and
the action is performed.
For example, referring to the automotive domain, functional
safety standards such as the ISO26262 can be used as a guide for
the definition of the monitored properties as in the approach of
Heffernan et al. [7]. The usage of approaches that perform predictive
runtime verification of timed properties may also be investigated [8,
9]. For instance, the approach in [9] exploits the structure of the
property to predict faults before they will actually materialize. The
verification monitor might also provide additional information such
as the minimum (maximum) time when the property can be violated
(satisfied) in the future.
4 MACHINE LEARNING
Reinforcement learning (RL) is an area of machine learning that
deals with decision-making. An RL agent interacts with the envi-
ronment by performing actions and it receives a reward. The agent
will learn to choose actions that maximize the cumulative reward.
In model-based reinforcement learning, the RL agent computes
an optimal policy on a model of the world, usually formalized
as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) extended with the reward
information associated to the transitions from one state to another.
The RL agent is also able to operate in a completely unknown
environment, i.e., it is able to learn the best strategy to be employed
when the only way to collect information about the environment
is by interacting with it. Basically, the RL agent will learn a policy
without knowing a priori a model of the environment, in this case,
we refer to model-free reinforcement learning.
In our approach we will use a combination of model-free and
model-based RL. First, we formalize the goals in terms of reward
functions at design-time. Then, at run-time, the monitor can inter-
fere with the reward function in case a violation of the invariants
is detected. This mechanism is called reward shaping and it steers
the RL agent to perform actions that will not trigger the monitor in
the future, guiding it towards its goals [10].
5 MONITORING
Our envisioned approach (WiseML) uses monitoring techniques
at run-time to prevent violations of invariants that will be caused
by the actions chosen by the machine learning engine. Since the
goal of monitoring is to avoid the execution of actions that will
cause violations, monitoring should be predictive. According the
available knowledge of the system and or the environment, different
monitoring approaches might be conceived and/or adopted.
Given the current model of the environment, the invariant that
must be ensured and the action a to be executed, the predictive
monitoring engine aims at detecting whether an action execution
will cause a violation of an invariant. In the case of no model of
the environment is available, the predictive monitor can only make
predictions on the structure of the property, on its current partial
satisfaction, and on the distance, in terms of actions, to be performed
in order to have a failure [9].
In general, the selection and design of predictive monitors open
interesting challenges. These include the definition of appropriate
semantics that consider whether a property will be satisfied or vio-
lated, the probability and distance from the potential failure, as well
as whether it is possible to control the system and its environment
in a way that satisfy the properties of interest (or avoid the failure).
Since properties satisfaction must be verified at run-time, seman-
tics must be defined taming the complexity of the corresponding
verification algorithms.
Solutions for these problems may exploit multi-valued seman-
tics [11]. These semantics are usually employed since two-valued
semantics cannot be used to monitor all properties, such as liveness
properties, and the satisfaction of these properties rely on how the
system will behave. An example of these semantics is LTL3. The se-
mantics of LTL3 is defined as follows: 1) satisfied; 2) violated; and 3)
inconclusive. The same authors also extend LTL3 with four-valued
semantics: 1) satisfies the property, 2) violates the property, 3) will
presumably violate the property, or 4) will presumably conform to
the property in the future, once the system has stabilized.
Another aspect to be considered in the selection of the monitor
is the type of invariants that should be ensured. Invariants describe
guarantees that the system must ensure. These may include prop-
erties that predicate on explicit time as well as branching or linear
notions of time. Examples of invariants that use a linear notion
of time and implicit and explicit time are “if the left turn signal
of the vehicle is on, it must eventually turn left" and “if the left
turn signal of the vehicle is on, it must turn left within 10 seconds",
respectively. Depending on the invariants to be analysed, different
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run-time monitors can be considered and used. It is important to
note that these monitors cannot predict exactly what will be the
behaviour of the system and if specific failures can be prevented.
However, they should be able to inform the system about the possi-
bility and probability of a failure. The output of our monitors may
be exploited to enhance the system with run-time mechanisms to
avoid failures. Triggered by our monitors, these mechanisms may
be able to act before the failure and take all the possible actions to
prevent failures.
We plan to automatically generate a predictive monitor from the
invariants using methods such as PREDIMO [12], a novel approach
where the properties to be monitored are specified in terms of
scenarios. This approach automatically synthesises a monitor by
exclusively exploiting the structure of the property and a partial
knowledge of the behaviour of the environment. By taking into
account the actual status and also the foreseen possible evolutions
of both system and environment in the near future, the generated
monitors provide an estimate of a potential incoming failure, in
terms of the distance to the failure and the degree of controllability
of the system. This enables the definition of run-time mechanisms
that, e.g. by avoiding specific actions or forcing other ones, might
prevent failures in the near future.
We will also evaluate the possibility of realizing monitors based
on game theory, like the approaches in [13–15].
6 DISCUSSION
WiseML is based on the idea to not program all the behaviours
and adaptation that the system should perform at design-time but
instead set up goals to achieve and train the system to achieve
them. Reinforcement learning is a framework that fits perfectly
with our needs of learning and adapting in order to reach the
desired goal. However, as pointed out in Section 2, using machine
learning techniques instead of traditional software imposes some
challenges. Decisions are not driven anymore by software written
by programmers following the requirements but on data and the
reward signal. With runtime monitoring, we envision to create a
satefy envelope around the machine learning system. The monitor
will prevent the RL agent to choose an action that violates important
invariants and it will train the agent to perform better in the future.
The correct selection of the reinforcement learning algorithm
and of the monitoring engine is crucial for obtaining an implemen-
tation of WiseML that behaves as expected. The machine learning
algorithm should be chosen depending on whether there is full or
partial observability about the environment in which the system is
deployed. Most likely the RL agent will have some initial knowl-
edge about the environment and it will be trained so that it can
learn about the environment as it explores it, in an online fashion.
The monitoring engine should be chosen considering the type of
invariants that need to be ensured as well as the desired effective-
ness and velocity in reacting to changes. It must be noticed that
machine learning and monitoring components cannot be chosen in
isolation, but their composed behaviour should be considered in
their selection and set-up.
Having an effective monitor may reduce performance. Indeed a
deeper analysis of invariants’ violations may cause a performance
overhead and at the end invalidate verification results. This may
occur when predictive monitoring is too slow and, before results
are obtained, the model of the environment already changed dras-
tically since other agents performed actions. For example, while
the monitoring verifies whether the action “crosses the intersection
within 2 seconds" can be performed (by also evaluating the effect
of other agents actions) the semaphore may turn red and invalidate
the obtained results. On the other hand, a less effective monitor
may return not accurate results. For example, a monitor that checks
whether a pedestrian is not crossing the road should also consider
the volumes of the objects carried by the pedestrian. This check
causes a performance overhead.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper envisions a new approach named WiseML. This paper
envisions a new approach named that aims at creating systems that,
on one hand are able to learn and adapt their behavior based on
changes that occur in the environment, on the other are able to
ensure that adaptation does not cause invariants violation. We dis-
cussed some challenges posed by reinforcement learning and how
combining it with runtime monitoring might solve some of these
challenges. We broadly discussed some possible solutions for the
proposed envisioned approach that may use reinforcement learning
as mechanisms to enable adaptation and predictive monitoring as
instrument to detect invariants violations.
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